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CASH BUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION
Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky, & 
Joseph Bankman
* 
I. INTRODUCTION
According to government reports, most individuals with business income
fail to pay all their taxes, although some appear to cheat more than others. 1 Un­
derpayment of tax on business income is commonly attributed to the receipt of
cash. 2 The owner of a clothing store, for example, might sell a dress for cash
and not report the cash. Underpayment of tax by individuals on business in­
come contributes significantly to the federal tax gaIT-the difference between
what taxpayers owe on legal source income and what they pay.3 
The government estimates that the annual tax gap equals $345 billion.4
Susan Cleary Morse is a Teaching Fellow at Santa Clara University School of
aw. Stewart Karlinsky is Professor Emeritus at San Jose State University. Joseph Bankman
is the Ralph M. Parsons Professor of Law and Business at Stanford Law School.
1. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, A STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX 
GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE 3
(2007) [hereinafter GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REPORT] (noting that "at least 6 1  %" of Schedule
C filers underreported net income in 2001 but that results were "skewed" in that the sole
proprietor taxpayers whose underpayment amounts put them in the top ten percent accounted
for sixty-one percent ofunderstated taxes).
2. See Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes From the Cash Econ-
omy, TAX NOTES, Oct. 29, 2007, at 506, 506-07 [hereinafter Cash Economy] (connecting
sole proprietor government data and the cash business sector).
3. See Eric Toder, What Is the Tax Gap?, TAX NOTES, Oct. 22, 2007, at 1, 2 (noting
that the tax gap measurement excludes noncompliance stemming from failure to report taxa­
ble income generated by illegal activities).
4. Treasury and the I.R.S. estimate the gross federal tax gap for 200 1 at $345 billion;
after enforcement and collection efforts and late payments, the net federal tax gap estimate
for 2001 is $290 billion. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
REDUCING THE TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE I (2007) [he­
reinafter 2007 TAX GAP REpORT] (reporting gross and net tax gap numbers); see also Toder,
supra note 3, at 5 (discussing National Research Program ("NRP") and I.R.S. estimation me­
thodology).
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38  STANFORD LA W & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 20: I 
About $109 billion of this is attributable to underpayment of taxes on business
income by individuals.5 Sole proprietors also underpay Social Security and
other payroll and self-employment taxes.6 Additional underpayments are attri­
butable to individuals who operate businesses as partnerships and small corpo­
rations. In the aggregate, small business owners report less than half of their
income, 7 and their underreporting (including informal workers such as garden­
ers) is estimated to comprise about half of the tax gap.8
This Article attempts to provide a qualitative picture of tax evasion in the
small business sector. It provides details from almost 275 field study interviews
with cash business owners and with tax preparers and bankers who serve cash
business clients. Our research suggests answers to the questions of who evades
taxes, what taxes they evade, and why and how they evade taxes.
This Article proceeds in three additional parts. Part II summarizes the main
threads of relevant social science research on small business tax compliance.
Part III describes the methodology and results of this interview study. Part IV
concludes.
II. TAX COMPLIANCE IN THE CASH BUSINESS SECTOR: EXISTING RESEARCH
A. Overview
The standard economic analysis frames a tax compliance decision as a
comparison between (1) the cost of paying tax and (2) the difference between
the benefit of avoiding the tax and the cost of the imposition of tax, interest,
and penalties, risk-adjusted for the possibility that the government will success­
fully challenge the tax avoidance strategy. 9 But this model does not provide a
complete picture of taxpayer compliance or the reasons for variations in tax­
payer compliance. Substantial behavioral research, including contributions
from sociology and psychology, deepens the analysis, and our research here of-
5 .  See 2007 TAX GAP REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 3  (reporting that the total underre-
porting gap contributed by individuals' failure to pay tax on business income equals $ 1 09
billion annually, comprised of $68 billion related to non-farm proprietor income and the bal­
ance related to farm income, rents, royalties, and pass-through income from partnerships, S­
corporations, estates and trusts) . 
6. See id. at I I  (reporting annual individual underpayment of payroll and self-
employment taxes of$80 billion).
7 .  See id. at 13- 14  (listing a non-farm sole proprietor misreporting rate of 57%). See
generally Cash Economy, supra note 2, at 508 (describing cash sector underreporting).
8. See supra notes 5-6 (noting annual underpayment estimates of $109 billion for
individual income taxes and $80 billion for individual payroll and self-employment taxes).
The sum of these amounts equals approximately 53 percent of the $345 billion annual tax
gap.
9.  See Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoreti-
cal Analysis, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 326 (1 972) (stating expected utility function).
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2009] CASHBUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION 39
fers more descriptive detail.
One summary of the behavioral compliance literature lists fourteen factors 
that may affect tax compliance, including age, gender, education, income level,
income source, peer influence, ethics, fairness, complexity, and tax rates. 10 For
our purposes, two of these factors, income source and peer influence, are most
relevant and are discussed below. We also discuss studies that explore the rela­
tionship between tax preparers and tax compliance.
B. Income Source
By far the most important determinant of tax compliance is income source.
Taxpayers report cash income less accurately than income subject to third party
reporting and/or withholding. I I  As noted in the introduction and accompanying
notes, individuals evade business-source income, which is commonly received
in cash, at a rate of approximately 50%,12 although this evasion is not evenly
distributed. 13 In contrast, the evasion rate on wage income-which employers
report to the government and on which taxes are withheld-is about 1 %.14 
Cash income represents one extreme of an income visibility spectrum
while income subject to third-party reporting or withholding occupies the other
1 0. See Betty R. Jackson & Valerie C. Milliron, Tax Compliance Research: Findings,
Problems and Prospects, 5 1. OF ACCT. LIT. 1 25, 127  ( 1986) (tabulating compliance factors);
Maryann Richardson & Adrian J. Sawyer, A Taxonomy of the Tax Compliance Literature:
Further Findings, Problems and Prospects, 1 6  AUSTL'N TAX FORUM 1 37, 145-50 (2001 )  
(listing compliance factors).
II. See Cash Economy, supra note 2, at 4 1 1 (outlining the effectiveness and efficien­
cy of third-party reporting); see also TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH
1 06-1 0  (Jeffrey A. Roth, John T. Scholz & Ann Dryden Witte, eds., 1 989) 1 06-1 0  [hereinaf­
ter Roth, Scholz & Witte] (discussing "transaction visibility and detection probability");
James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 8 1 8,
84 1 -43 ( 1998) (summarizing studies indicating that "noncompliance is discouraged by a
high risk of detection"); Richardson & Sawyer, supra note 1 0, at 145-50 (discussing the in­
come source factor).
1 2 .  See supra note 7 (citing sole proprietor misreporting rate o f  57%).
1 3 .  For example, the GAO reports that i n  200 1 , 1 0  percent o f  sole proprietor returns
containing tax understatements, numbering about 1 .25 million, yielded an average $ 1 8,000
tax understatement and generated about 6 1  % of underreported sole proprietor income. 50
percent of underreporting sole proprietors understated income by an average of less than
$903, according to the GAO, See GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REpORT, supra note I, at 3, 14-16
(noting that underreporting amounts are "skewed"). Figures from 2001  also show, for exam­
ple, that income underreporting of farm income earned by individuals stands at an average of
72%, compared to an average of 57% for non-farm sole proprietors. See 2007 TAX GAP
REpORT, supra note 4, at 1 3  (giving figures).
1 4. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
GREAT DEBATE OVER TAXES 1 78 (3d ed. 2004) (giving 1 992 compliance estimates); see also
2007 TAX GAP REpORT, supra note 4, at 1 4  (sorting compliance rates based on level of in­
formation reporting).
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40 STANFORD LA W & POLICYREVIEW [Vol. 20:1 
end. Some studies show, for example, that taxpayers are more likely to report
income received in check form than income received in cash. 15 Taxpayer con­
cerns that the government will detect a failure to pay taxes appear closely re­
lated to, but not completely dependent on, income source. 16 
The strong relationship between evasion and income source suggests that
the primary causal factor that explains evasion is opportunity. Employees
whose employers comply with wage reporting rules cannot cheat successfully
and so such employees do not cheat. Individual business owners can cheat suc­
cessfully (because no one reports much of their income to the government and
because their income is hard to detect on audit) 1 7  and, in the aggregate, indi­
vidual business owners do cheat. The literature on income source, accordingly,
applies directly to a study of evasion in the cash business sector: it predicts a
high rate of evasion in the sector and identifies the sector as a, if not the, lead­
ing source of non-compliance.
C. Peer Influence and Social Norms
A substantial body of research shows that taxpayers who believe their
peers evade tax are more likely to evade tax themselves. 18 This correlation does
not necessarily translate to the conclusion that the behavior of a taxpayer's
peers causes the taxpayer's behavior. For example, peer behavior may be used
to defend a prior decision not to comply, or (less plausibly) a noncompliant
k I· 1 9  taxpayer may see out noncomp Iant peers.
Some studies do find a causal relationship, however. For example, one pa­
per reports, based on longitudinal survey data, that a taxpayer tends to internal­
ize the taxpaying norms of a group with which the taxpayer strongly identi­
fies.2o The compliance norms of individuals outside a taxpayer's small circle
1 5. See Richardson & Sawyer, supra note 1 0, at 1 71 (reporting three studies demon­
strating that tax compliance is higher for income received in the form of a check).
1 6. See Gregory A. Carnes & Ted D. Englebrecht, An Investigation of the Effect of 
Detection Risk Perceptions, Penalty Sanctions, and Income Visibility on Tax Compliance, 1 7  
J .  AM. TAX'N ASS'N 26, 39 ( 1 995) (reporting results of study that presented hypothetical sce
narios to taxpayers and measured income visibility and perceived detection risk).
1 7. Cf Toder, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that, in the tax gap calculation, raw low­
visibility income underreporting figures resulting from audits are multiplied by a factor of 
3.3 to 4.2 to account for auditors' inability to detect all noncompliance).
1 8. See, e.g., Benno Torgler, Speaking to Theorists and Searchingfor Facts: Tax Mo
rale and Tax Compliance in Experiments, 16  J. ECON. SURV. 657, 663-66 (2002) (describing
studies connecting group decisionmaking or cultural differences to individual tax compliance
decisions).
1 9. See Richardson & Sawyer, supra note 1 0, at 1 74 (describing reverse causation
theory); Roth, Scholz & Witte, supra note I I , at 1 1 2- 13  (same).
20. See Michael Wenzel, Motivation or Rationalisation? Causal Relations Between
Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance, 46 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 491 ,  504-05 (2005) (reporting
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2009] CASHBUSINESSES AND TAXEVASION 41
may also have relevance, but the relationship is less certain. 2 1  Another study
suggests, for example, that mere mention by the government of broad social
compliance norms cannot persuade taxpayers to comply. 22 
Another social norm question is whether attitudes toward government in 
general, such as approval ofgovernment policies or the political party in power,
have a significant effect on tax compliance. Some studies show no such ef­
fect,23 while others support a link.24 Several studies indicate that taxpayers'
perception of the equity of the tax system affects their compliance behavior. 25 
Research on the effect of norms generally does not focus on the cash busi­
ness sector, but some of its findings can extend to that sector and have relev­
ance for understanding evasion in that sector. One plausible hypothesis, based
on these findings, is that the (correctly) assumed high level of non-compliance
within the cash business sector contributes to, and in fact, increases the level of,
non-compliance in that sector. Another hypothesis, not inconsistent with the
first, is that differing beliefs as to peer behavior account for a significant varia­
tion in compliance among those in the cash business sector.26 
that group norms affect personal ethics when a taxpayer identifies with the group}; cf James
Aim, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Changing the Social Norm of Tax Com
pliance by Voting, 52 KYKLOS 1 41 ,  1 53, 1 61 ( l 999) (reporting increased compliance if ex­
perimental subjects were permitted to communicate with each other about their compliance
decisions).
2 1 .  See Richardson & Sawyer, supra note 1 0, at 1 75-76 (noting that the lack of clarity
with respect to the interaction between taxpayer compliance and broad social norms).
22. See Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Siernrod, Do Normative Ap­
peals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence From a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 
NAT'L TAX J. 1 25, 1 31-32 (2001 )  (reporting that when the Minnesota Department of Reve­
nue sent letters to some taxpayers explaining that 93 percent of taxpayers were compliant,
the effort had a small, statistically insignificant, positive impact on compliance). The same
study explored the impact of a broader social norm, that of valuing government benefits, on
tax compliance by sending some taxpayers a letter describing the educational, health care
and other services supported by state income tax dollars. This letter also had a small, statisti­
cally insignificant, positive impact on compliance. See id. at 1 3 1  (reporting results).
23.  See Roth, Scholz & Witte, supra note II, at 1 26 (reporting little correlation be­
tween perceived government legitimacy and tax compliance).
24. See Joel Slernrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J .  
ECON. PERSP. 25, 40 (2007) (citing three surveys finding a correlation between disapproval
of tax evasion and declared trust in government, but noting that such survey results could
reflect rationalizations ofpre-existing compliance decisions).
25. See id., at 39 ("In particular, tax evasion decisions may depend on perceptions of
the fairness of the tax evasion system."); see also Roth, Scholz & Witte, supra note I I , at
127-29 (citing studies that find positive correlations between tax compliance and different
equity measures, particularly exchange and horizontal equity). Roth, Scholz and Witte dis­
tinguish exchange equity, or the relationship between taxes paid and government benefits
received; horizontal equity, or the similarity of tax burdens for similarly situated taxpayers;
and vertical equity, or the perceived relative fairness of tax burdens for differently situated
taxpayers. See id. 
26. Cf supra note 1 3  (noting that levels of noncompliance vary significantly among
sole proprietors).
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42 STANFORD LA W & POLICYREVIEW [Vol. 20:1
D. Tax Preparer Influence
Taxpayers with business income typically rely on preparers to help in tax
filings.27 These preparers serve as "gatekeepers,,28 who may (or may not) im­
prove the compliance behavior of their clients. A number of studies have ex­
amined how taxpayers choose their preparers, with varying results. For exam­
ple, one set of survey results suggests that taxpayers choose a tax adviser who
reflects their attitudes toward compliance; 29 another study suggests that once
taxpayers have chosen a tax preparer, they tend to somewhat passively follow
the advice of that tax preparer. 30
Other studies focus on possible connections between tax preparer characte­
ristics and taxpayer compliance.3 1  One line of research, for example, indicates
that a licensed tax preparer is likely to influence a taxpayer to be more aggres­
sive on ambiguous questions and less aggressive on unambiguous questions. 32 
One study concluded from data gathered through experimental cases presented
to CPAs and non-CPAs that CPAs took more pro-taxpayer positions in ambi­
guous situations but advised compliance with the law if the rules were suffi­
ciently clear. 33 Another paper demonstrated, based on randomly selected I.R.S.
audit data, that CPA-prepared returns result in fewer audit adjustments com­
pared to non CPA-prepared returns.34
27. See, e.g., NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESSES, NATIONAL SMALL
BUSINESS POLL: COMPLEXITY AND THE I .R.S. 6 (2006) (reporting that eighty-eight percent of
businesses with between I and 250 employees use a paid tax preparer or accountant to pre­
pare their federal income tax returns).
28. See, e.g., Reinier R. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party En
forcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53-54 ( 1 986) (outlining the concept of "gate­
keeper liability").
29. See Yuka Sakurai & Valerie Braithwaite, Taxpayers' Perceptions of Practition­
ers: Finding One Who Is Effective and Does the Right Thing?, 46 J. Bus. ETHICS 375, 385
(2003) (reporting results based on a survey ofAustralian taxpayers).
30. See Lin Mei Tan, Taxpayers' Preference for Type of Advice from Tax Practition
er: A Preliminary Examination, 20 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 431 ,  445 ( 1 999) (reporting conclu­
sion). But cf Peggy A. Rite & Gary A. McGill, An Examination of Taxpayer Preference for
Aggressive Tax Advice, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 389, 399 (2003) (stating that taxpayers prefer con­
servative advice and may decide to cease using a preparer who gives aggressive advice with
which they disagree).
3 1 .  See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note II, at 846-47 (summarizing research
relating to tax practitioners' roles and taxpayers' choice of tax preparers).
32. See Steven Klepper, Mark Mazur & Daniel Nagin, Expert Intermediaries and Le
gal Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers, 63 1. L. & ECON. 205, 228-29 ( 1 99 1 )  (reporting
based on model and empirical analysis that expert participation in tax return preparation
"will discourage noncompliance on legally unambiguous income sources but encourage non­
compliance on ambiguous sources").
33. See Frances L. Ayres, Betty R. Jackson & Peggy S. Rite, The Economic Benefits
of Regulation, 64 ACCT. REv. 300, 307 ( 1 989) (reporting conclusion).
34. See Peggy A. Rite & John Rasseldine, Tax Practitioner Credentials and the Inci-
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2009] CASH BUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION 43
The preparer studies, like the work on taxpayer norms, do not focus specif­
ically on the cash business sector. But the studies have relevance for our de­
scription below of the preparer market. 35 Consider the studies suggesting that
licensed preparers such as CPAs confine their aggressive advice to ambiguous
situations and decline to advise their clients outright on tax evasion strategies.
These studies might predict that licensed tax preparers refuse to accept tax­
evading cash business taxpayers as clients. Or, the studies might suggest that
licensed tax preparers and taxpayers often have a tacit understanding that they
will not discuss cash income, so as to permit the tax preparer to avoid the un­
comfortable question of whether to participate in what is plainly an evasion
scheme. Our research indicates that the latter prediction is more accurate.
E. What We Don't Know About Evasion in the Cash Sector
Notwithstanding an impressive body of work on tax compliance (only
hinted at in the brief summary above), we know surprisingly little about tax 
evasion in the business sector, aside from the consensus that, in the aggregate,
owners of small businesses with substantial cash revenue fail to pay about half
their taxes. One fundamental problem is that we lack any thick qualitative de­
scription of the actions or attitudes of those in the sector. We do not know very
much about how taxpayers evade tax, how they view their actions, how they
use preparers, or how preparers in the sector view their role and their clients.
We suspect our lack of knowledge has resulted from a disconnect between
the quantitative methodological tools used in most prior studies and the com­
plex and norm-driven nature of the particular behavior at issue. The core gov­
ernment tax gap data emerges from the statistical sampling methods used in the
work of the so-called National Research Program and its predecessor, the Tax­
payer Compliance Measurement Program.36 But neither these empirical tech­
niques nor others such as surveys or studies that record subjects' reaction to 
hypothetical situations can provide the missing qualitative description of cash
business taxpayer behavior.37 We suspect the reason for this is that standard
dence of I.R.S. Audit Adjustments, 1 7  ACCT. HORIZONS 1 , 12 - 13  (2003) (reporting conclu
sion).
35 .  See infra Part I I I .E (discussing findings regarding tax preparers).
36. See Mark 1. Mazur & Alan H. Plumley, Understanding the Tax Gap, 60 NAT'L 
TAX J. 569, 572-73 (2007) (describing statistical techniques used in tax gap estimates).
37 .  For examples of survey methodology, see Sakurai & Braithwaite, supra note 29,
at 378 and Wenzel, supra note 20, at 495-98. For an example of a hypothetical study me­
thod, see Carnes & Englebrecht, supra note 16, at 3 1 -33 .  We are aware of one study based
on informal interviews of several housepainters which detailed several strategies used by the
interviewees to maintain low income visibility. See Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of 
Income Tax Violations in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 76,89-92 & n.6 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John
T. Scholz eds. 1 989) (discussing low-visibility strategies such as minimizing bank deposits
and purchasing supplies with cash and describing interview method). Another study of the
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44 STANFORD LA W & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 20: I 
survey and hypothetical situation methodology does not work well in areas de­
fined by criminal conduct. The relatively short, fixed questions or limited fact
patterns that populate such surveys and hypothetical studies cannot elicit the
detailed responses necessary to fully describe the experience of individuals en­
gaged in regular and systematic tax evasion. This results in part due to the lim­
its of the format-subjects are not given an opportunity to add much detail­
and in part due to the subjects' predictable concerns that disclosing information
about illegal activity like tax evasion may lead to potential financial or even
criminal liability.
III. THIS INTERVIEW STUDY
In this Part III we describe our study and its results. Part lILA outlines
our methodology; Part II.B sets out our findings about the extent of evasion and
what kinds of taxes are evaded. In Parts IILe, D, E and F, we discuss how cash
businesses evade taxes by using a cash economy, designing employee controls,
finding appropriate tax preparers, and dismissing the risk of audit. In Part III.G
we briefly consider the reasons cash businesses give for underreporting deci­
sions.
A. Methodology
The interviews we conducted belong most closely to the field study catego­
ry of research techniques. Social scientists use field study research, including
informal interviews, to study "people acting in the natural courses of their daily
lives.,,38 Field study research encompasses many strategies, including the in­
formal interview technique relied on to gather the data presented here. 39 Field
study research is particularly useful when it is impossible to conduct a rando­
mized study to examine the behavior of interest, or as a means of identifying
mental processes related to VAT compliance by small business owners used an informal in­
terview approach similar to ours here. See Paul Webley, Caroline Adams & Henk Elffers,
Value Added Tax Compliance in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 175, 183-85 (Edward
McCaffery & Joel Siernrod, eds. 2006) (outlining informal interview method). Another re­
search approach related to our methodology here involves the collection and coding of tax­
payer diaries. See John S. CarrolJ, How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and
Values, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 43, 58-59 (Joel Siernrod ed., 1992) (discussing diary data
sources).
38. ROBERT M. EMERSON, CONTEMPORARY FIELD RESEARCH 1 (2d ed. 2001). 
39. See CAROL A. BAILEY, A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE FIELD RESEARCH 96-98 (2d ed. 
2007) (discussing "unstructured interviews"). But see BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. 
STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
167-68 (1967) (cautioning that collections of interview material should be used in combina­
tion with other data sources to avoid too much attachment to interview anecdotes).
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2009] CASHBUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION 45
testable hypotheses for future studies conducted by other means.40 
Our study consisted of almost 275 interviews with individuals associated
with cash businesses, including cash business owners, bankers, and tax prepar­
ers. As is customary with field studies, our subjects were not chosen randomly.
The business owners we interviewed typically collected a substantial portion of
their revenue in cash; the bankers we interviewed had experience in extending
loans to cash business owners.
Our interviewee base included both fully licensed Certified Public Accoun­
tants and candidates preparing for the final CPA licensure exam;41 for simplici­
ty, we refer to individuals in both groups as "CPAs." Our interviewees included
accountants from the tier of national firms that includes Grant Thornton, BDO
Seidman, and RSM McGladrey. We also interviewed CPAs from small or mid­
sized regional firms with between one and 200 employees. We did not include
CPAs from the largest accounting firms of Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or
PricewaterhouseCoopers, which each employ between 20,000 and 40,000
people in the US. The largest accounting firms serve relatively few of the small
business owners who interested us in this study.
Some of the characteristics of the interviewees are set forth in Table 1 and
the accompanying notes.
40. See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 6 (2d ed.
1994) (stating that explanatory research approaches can help answer how" and why" ques­
tions).
41 .  Although CPA requirements vary by state, CPA candidates must generally meet
both educational requirements and work experience requirements before sitting for the CPA
certification exam. See, e.g., CALIF. BD. OF ACCOUNTANCY, CPA LICENSING APPLICANT
HANDBOOK 1 2, available at http://www.dca.ca.gov/cbalpublications/applbook.pdf (last vi­
sited Feb. 2 1 ,  2008) (listing different avenues to CPA licensure).
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46 STANFORD LA W & POLICYREVIEW [Vol. 20:1 
TABLE 1: Summary of Field Study Interviewees42 
CPAs Business Owners Bankers
New York 20 52 0
58 8 0
San Francisco/ 27 14 10
San Jose Area
Kansas 30 0 0
Honolulu 3 0 22
Centerville  6 6 0
Los 2 12 0
Other 3 0 0
TOTAL 149 92 32
Individuals who engage in tax evasion face a panoply of overlapping civil
and criminal penalties.44 This makes data collection in this area difficult. In­
deed, we speculate in Part II.E. of this Article that it is this fact-the potential
liability concerns of respondents-that is responsible for the dearth of interview
or qualitative data about cash sector evasion. To assure our subjects that their
identity would be kept confidential, we did not memorialize the interviews in
contemporary notes.45 In addition, the interviews were conducted in as conver­
sational manner as possible, designed to elicit information without (overly)
42. Most of the Chicago and Kansas City interviews and some of the San Francis­
co/San Jose interviews took place in the context oftraining sessions conducted by one author
for several national accounting frms and for education programs run by professional associ­
ations. The Honolulu interviews occurred in connection with training sessions held by a pub­
licly traded bank. The training sessions drew on geographic areas wider than the city in 
which they were held. Interviewees at the San Francisco/San Jose training sessions, for ex­
ample, were from various parts of California. Chicago and Kansas City interviewees hailed
from Chicago, Kansas City, Davenport, Iowa and smaller towns and cities in the Midwest.
Honolulu interviewees came from different Hawaiian Islands. The interviews took place be­
tween 1998 and 2002.
43. The city we call "Centerville" is a medium-sized California city of about 30,000
year-round residents. Significant components of its economy include agriculture, tourism,
and educational and health services.  
44. These include civil penalties such as a 20 percent accuracy penalty to a 75% fraud
penalty, and criminal penalties that include felony conviction and up to five years' impri­
sonment. See LR.C. § 6662 et seq. (civil penalties); I.R.C. § 7201 et. seq. (criminal penal­
ties). A related set of penalties apply to preparers who aid and abet in evasion. See, e.g., 
I .R.C. § 6694 (understatement by preparer); I.R.C. § 7206 (aiding and abetting in tax fraud). 
45 . For the same confidentiality reason, respondents are not identifed in this Article.
The interview results reported here were earlier recorded in a conference paper. See Stewart
Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Developing a Theory of Cash Businesses' Tax Evasion Beha
vior and the Role of Their Preparers, 5 AUSTL. SCH. OF TAX'N UNIV. OF N.S.W. INT'L CONF.
ON TAX ADMIN. (2002).
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2009] CASHBUSINESSES AND TAXEVASION 47
raising concerns about potential liability.46
Our interviews typically covered several different questions:
1. Who evades taxes? Under what conditions is evasion usually ob­
served?
2. What taxes are evaded? Just income taxes, or sales, payroll and
other taxes as well?
3. How are taxes evaded? How do taxpayers who wish to evade find 
a sympathetic tax preparer? What strategies do taxpayers use to 
identify what income they will pay tax on?
4. Why does tax evasion occur? Are factors such as tax law complex­
ity or a negative attitude toward government important? Would re­
placing the income tax with a flat tax based on consumption re­
duce evasion?
As is true of many field studies and all survey data, our results depend on
the subjects' willingness to describe their behavior and on the accuracy of that
description. Here, we ask subjects to describe behavior that, at least in theory,
can be prosecuted as a felony. One might expect, therefore, that interviewees
would tend to underreport this behavior or to tell us about the least offensive
violations. Since we had little difficulty eliciting stories ofevasion, this tenden­
cy to underreport evasion, ifpresent, would generally strengthen our results. On
the other hand, it is also possible (though we think less likely) that interviewees
may have offered tales of tax cheating because they felt that was what we
hoped to hear. We believe that this possibility of demand bias is mitigated by
the graphic details offered by interviewees to illustrate their stories.
In general, our results provide a qualitative description of evasion in the 
cash business sector that does not duplicate anything in the existing literature.
Where the questions we ask overlap with questions asked in the existing litera­
ture, we note that and state whether our findings are consistent. Some of our
results suggest hypotheses that could be tested through more conventional
means, such as regression analysis or randomized survey data. Where that is the
case, we discuss the hypotheses and how they might be tested.
46. See BAILEY, supra note 39, at 96 (explaining the similarity between interview re­
search and conversation).
     
  
 
  
  
  
 
    
 
   
  
 
   
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
   
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 48 2009
     
  
        
          
        
            
         
          
      
         
  
       
            
           
             
   
 
      
               
          
        
        
           
             
  
 
         
         
         
   
       
        
     
     
               
              
                
  
           
                  
             
            
    
48 STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 20:1
B. Overview: Extent of Evasion and Kinds of Taxes Evaded
Virtually all of our interviewees believed that small businesses fail to re­
port some of their cash income. Their particular comments on evasion are de­
tailed below. Most of our interviewees hailed from urban areas although our
interviews in Centerville, in Hawaii, and with conference participants from
smaller cities add some diversity to our interviewee base. We did not notice a
difference in our main result-that cash businesses evade tax on cash income­
based on the size or geographic location of the town or city where a particular
interviewee worked.
Interviewees frequently reported that taxpayers' failure to report cash in­
come was linked to sales tax and payroll tax evasion as well as income tax eva­
sion. Payroll taxes consist of Social Security and Medicare Hospital Insurance
taxes and are levied at a combined rate of 15.3% on approximately the first
$100,000 of wage income.47 Self-employment taxes are substitutes for payroll
taxes; they are levied at the same aggregate rate and fund the same programs.48 
A storekeeper who underreports cash income and uses that income to pay em­
ployees unreported wages and/or pay herself unreported self-employment in­
come evades income, payroll and/or self-employment taxes. Nonpayment of 
self-employment taxes is estimated to comprise $39 billion, or sixteen percent
of the gross tax gap, and is widely thought to be associated with underreporting
of business income.49
Most interviewees also reported a link between sales tax evasion and in­
come and employment tax evasion. For some employees, sales taxes were the
primary motivation for underreporting. A storekeeper we interviewed explained
it like this:
Storekeeper Actually, I don't gain anything cheating on in­
come tax this year. I have such a big loss on
another investment I don't pay tax.
Interviewer Then why not report?
47. In 2008, employees paid a 6.2% Social Security tax on the first $ 102,000 of wag­
es. In addition, employees paid a 1.45% Medicare Hospital Insurance tax on all wages. Em­
ployers pay matching taxes on wages paid. See I.R.C. §§ 3 10 I, 3 1 11 (setting forth these pay­
roll taxes).
48. See I.R.c. §§ 140 1, 1402 (setting forth similar self-employment taxes).
49. See 2007 TAX GAP REPORT, supra note 4, at II (citing data sorted by type of tax);
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR
REDUCING THE TAX GAP 6 (2006) (noting relationship between underreported income and
underpayment of self-employment tax).
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2009] CASHBUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION
Storekeeper Sales tax. Six percent doesn't sound like a lot,
but it's thousands every month and it's on the
gross.
49
We often found that interviewees saw income underreporting as a neces­
sary corollary to the more important goals of nonpayment of sales and em­
ployment tax. Many cash business owners focused on the sales tax, in particu­
lar, as the tax to avoid because it is levied on gross revenue and directly reduces
profit margins. Sales tax applies even to unprofitable businesses and individu­
als with unrelated losses and no tax due. A profitable business with low mar­
gins may pay more in sales tax than income tax. More than one small business
owner we interviewed stated that replacing the income tax with a consumption
or "flat" tax would not affect his behavior, since it would not eliminate em­
ployment or sales taxes. The employment and sales tax link also indicates that
cooperation between federal and state governments is a promising compliance
strategy. 50 
C. Parallel Cash Economies ofSmall Businesses
I. Summary
We found that many small businesses that evade taxes do so by construct­
ing parallel cash economies. 51 They collect cash revenues, often pay some ex­
penses in cash, and then use the unreported cash they receive for cash purchas­
es, rather than depositing it. Cash businesses that evade taxes must often make
do with self-financing strategies, or at least accept that bank loans will be based
on their reported income only. 
Parallel cash economies are kept secret from the I.R.S. and state tax author­
ities. But they are not necessarily kept secret from everyone. Business owners
face internal control issues relating to the risk that employees will keep some
cash proceeds for themselves. They also face the question of how to find a
sympathetic tax preparer and whether to confide in the tax preparer.
50. In November 2007, the I.R.S. announced a federal-state cooperation initiative di­
rected toward improving payroll and employment tax compliance. See I.R.S. Fact Sheet
2007-25 (Nov. 2007) (describing the Questionable Employment Tax Practices project joined
by the I.R.S. and tax authorities in California, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and North
Carolina).
5 1 .  Cash use in the U.S. is concentrated in retail sale transactions. Although credit and
debit cards have eroded the use of cash, it remains an important form of payment. One study
puts the use of cash in 2000 at 20% of consumer payments, down from 3 1  % in 1 974, and
reports that the use of credit and debit cards rose from 13% to 27% over the same period,
while check use fell from 56% to 46%. See David B. Humphrey, Replacement of Cash by 
Cards in U.S. Consumer Payments, 56 J. ECON. & Bus. 2 11, 223 (2004) (reporting results).
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50 STANFORD LA W & POLICYREVIEW [Vol. 20:1
2. Cash revenue
The first requirement for a parallel cash economy is cash revenue. The
storekeeper quoted above explained it like this:
What I do is, people come in and buy stuff. If they pay with check or Visa, I 
record it. Guy comes in and if I am there and he spends over $40 [in cash], it's
entered into the computer as an invoice-in-progress. End of the day I get a
separate print out [of] all the invoices-in-progress, and they're erased from
memory. I take the cash home. Never deposit the cash, ever.
This storekeeper focused on eliminating all records of cash transactions. As 
we discuss below, he initially neglected one piece of the puzzle: his inputs or
expenses. But his careful approach to erasing records of cash revenues is in­
structive, and it is echoed in other interview results, such as reports of hair sa­
lons that erase pencil entries or fail to record walk-in business, or jewelry shop
owners who do not enter cash transactions into their bookkeeping systems.
Another consideration revealed by the storekeeper's story is the question of 
how to segregate non-reportable cash transactions from the rest of the business.
Other businesses we heard about employed similar strategies and heuristics.
One practitioner told us of a small clothing retailer that opened its doors on
Saturdays to certain customers who paid only in cash, which the retailer did not
report. Another clothing retailer explained that he had a rule of thumb of report­
ing only 85% of sales. Several veterinarians we interviewed similarly suggested
that they did not report between ten and twenty percent of their revenue. In 
each case, cash sales comprised the unreported portion.
Some interviewees suggested that checks were almost as good as cash, be­
cause they could be used as cash. Several interviewees in the jewelry, antique,
and trophy businesses explained that checks received on the sale of merchan­
dise were frequently signed over to suppliers in exchange for fresh inventory.
Other interviewees stated that cashing (as opposed to depositing) a check did
not leave a paper trail significant enough to present an audit concern.
In contrast, most interviewees reported that credit card receipts were gen­
erally reported as taxable revenue. This finding has relevance for the proposal
to require credit and debit card issuers to report processed payments to mer­
chants. 52 The proposal would further increase the visibility of merchant card
receipts. If most credit-card related receipts are already reported, one might
conclude that the proposal is a waste of effort as there may be (relatively) little
additional tax to be collected from this source. However, credit card reporting
may be a useful method of estimating cash income and in that sense an impor­
tant weapon against underreporting. Consider a restaurant that reports $150,000
52. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S 
FISCAL YEAR 2009 REVENUE PROPOSALS 65-66 (2008) (proposing merchant payment card
information reporting).
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2009] CASH BUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION 51
of gross sales but is shown to have $140,000 of credit card receipts. The lop­
sided ratio of credit transactions to cash transactions suggests that the restaurant. d . h 53 IS un erreportmg cas .
The question of already-perceived income visibility also has relevance for
any proposal to expand third-party reporting to banks.54 Our research suggests
that cash business owners regard bank deposits and withdrawals as more visible
than cash, but less visible than credit card transactions. If most bank transac­
tions are already reported for tax purposes, a third-party reporting requirement
for banks may not make sense as a tool intended to increase reporting of in­
come deposited into bank accounts. But as with merchant card payment data,
information about bank transactions other benefits may have other uses. For
example, a total income measurement formula or audit filter might compare re­
ported bank transactions to total reported income to help determine whether a
taxpayer had underreported. 
We found that businesses express their preference for cash (or checks) in
different ways. Some state it explicitly, as in the case of the clothing retailer de­
scribed above who accepts only cash on preferred-customer Saturdays. In other
cases it is an industry norm. The tax preparers and businesspeople we spoke to
in the jewelry and construction businesses, for example, suggested that many
jewelers and contractors offer a 20% discount for cash transactions. A study
involving researchers posing as potential consumers might confirm this data
point. For example, some researchers might offer certain businesses cash and
the prices they negotiated could be compared with prices negotiated by a con­
trol group that did not offer cash.55
3. Cash business expenses
The strategies described in the preceding paragraphs relate to the revenue
side of a parallel cash business. But the careful businessperson must consider
inputs or expenses as well. Our interviewees generally considered overstating
deductions an inferior strategy relative to misreporting income. "Never do any­
thing with deductions," one business owner told us. Several accountants offered
the maxim, "If you are going to cheat, cheat on the income side or cheat on the
53.  The government could develop more precise audit selection criteria based on ex­
pected bank card-to-cash receipts revenues more readily if it received comprehensive infor­
mation about bank card receipts.
54. See GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REPORT, supra note I ,  at 49-50 (considering the ad­
vantages and disadvantages ofrequiring banks to file information returns with respect to sole
proprietor deposits and withdrawals).
55. Any such study would involve issues such as controlling for industry and geo­
graphic factors and acknowledging nontax reasons, such as credit card charges or the possi­
bility ofbad checks, that cause merchants to prefer cash payment.
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52 STANFORD LA W & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 20:1
deduction side, but not both." In fact, a number of our interviewees reported the 
opposite problem: that understatement of income made even accurately re­
ported deductions seem too large.
Consider the following problem faced by Storekeeper:
Last year I gave my accountant all recorded sales and all costs. Accountant
says to me, Donald, the way you've done it, you've lost $80,000. You can't
show a loss of $80,000, it' s  impossible; the I.R.S. 'II be all over you, you can't
live where you live and show that.
Another interviewee, a semi-retired accountant who had specialized in the cash
business sector, highlighted the state sales tax audit risk that can result from
failing to show a profit:
Interviewer Studies show that small cash businesses report
about 50% of their gross income. Is that your
experience?
Accountant 50%? No. I'd say 33%.
Interviewer Do your clients ever get caught?
Accountant Oh, yes, the SBE [California State Board of 
Equalization] comes in and says you bought too
many goods to have grossed what you grossed.
Then they recalculate profit.
To avoid this problem, some businesses try to pay for inventory and other
expenses in cash, and then not report the expenditure. The "cheat on the gross
income" approach has two advantages to a "cheat on the deduction" approach.
First, understating income reduces sales and employment taxes. Overstating
deductions has no effect on those taxes. Second, paying employees and suppli­
ers in cash provides employees or suppliers with tax-free income of their own.
Several restaurateurs explained to us that they would not have the right bar­
tenders, waitresses or entertainment unless cash was used to lubricate the
process. Paying non-reported cash also makes workers complicit in the evasion
scheme, and therefore less likely to report it.56
Other interviewees reported sometimes elaborate schemes involving the
purchase and sale of certain inventory. One preparer told us about an owner of 
100 vending machines who bought the goods-potato chips, M&Ms and
such-for thirty of his most profitable machines from a wholesaler such as
56. See infra Part III.D (discussing employee controls).
    
             
           
        
    
             
         
            
       
   
             
           
           
  
    
       
 
 
 
          
  
         
        
 
  
             
 
 
    
    
           
  
            
     
     
      
  
  
           
  
          
          
 
         
        
   
       
         
 
        
               
 
       
          
      
    
  
         
  
          
   
        
              
  
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 53 2009
      
    
    
    
     
    
      
     
   
    
            
            
  
   
            
     
      
   
           
  
           
         
  
     
             
   
  
       
 
   
   
   
     
    
    
            
            
         
 
      
   
2009] CASH BUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION 53
Sam's or Costco for cash. He segregated the cash from those machines as non­
reportable cash. We heard similar stories about a clothing retailer that bought
and sold half its inventory in cash and about jewelry and antiques businesses
that bought inventory from individuals and estates for cash and sold it for cash.
Several interviewees described flower businesses that bought seeds for cash,
paid employees in cash and sold their wares at farmers' markets for cash.
We did hear some reports of taxpayers overstating their deductions. In 
many of these cases, taxpayers lacked the ability to minimize taxes by not re­
porting cash income. A few taxpayers explained that if their deductions were
low in a particular category, their tax preparers would decrease their tax bill by
plugging in a higher number that conformed to the national averages published
by the government. 57
Our findings as to the relative importance of understated receipts (rather
than overstated deductions) in tax evasion is not entirely consistent with other
literature. The latest government study estimates that understated receipts com­
prise about 55% of the tax gap in this area; the remainder is comprised of over­
stated deductions.58 This estimate is consistent with our finding that unders­
tated receipts are the largest source of underreporting, but gives a larger role to 
overstated deductions than does our study. It is possible that the sole proprie­
tors who report significant overstated deductions do not receive significant cash
receipts and consequently lack the opportunity to underreport receipts.
4. Cash spending
The next piece of the parallel cash economy involves spending the cash­
for the cash business owners and preparers we spoke to generally agreed that
one must avoid depositing it. We heard three strategies from our interviewees:
spend it; hoard it; and invest it in the business.
The spending strategies typically involved purchases of personal property
such as jewelry, rugs, antiques, clothing, and furniture. One preparer remarked
that cash business taxpayers often have homes whose modest exteriors belie
their expensive contents--clothing, jewelry, artwork, rugs, and furniture which
may be valued at two or three times the value of the structure and land. Many
interviewees also reported spending cash at restaurants and hotels.
Such spending, however, may not absorb a business's free unreported cash
flow. Business owners typically reported spending between one and five thou-
57. See, e.g., Kelly Lutrell, Patrice Treubert & Michael Parisi, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, INTEGRATED BUSINESS DATA 2003, at 95 (giving average fgures for different cate­
gories of deductions for nonfarm sole proprietorships of varying sizes), available at
http://ww.irs.gov/pub/irs-soilo3intbus.pdf.
58. See GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (citing income and de­
duction error data).
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54 STANFORD LA W & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 20: 1 
sand dollars a month on personal property purchases and hotel and restaurant
expenses. Surplus cash can build up, and many of our interviewees reported
that business owners who significantly underreport income often eventually
purchase investments, housing and cars, boats or airplanes that are inconsistent
with reported income. Many of these items carry paper trails such as brokerage
account records, property transfer recordings or property tax assessments, or
vehicle titles.
Many of our interviewees told us of hoarding strategies, often describing
safe deposit boxes full of cash. Some explained that heirs would rush to clean
out such safe deposit boxes when the depositor died. Many also reported in­
vestment in the business, saying that business owners purchased additional in­
ventory or made capital improvements with surplus cash.
Our finding that business owners find themselves with assets that are in­
consistent with tax records suggests the following two-part research strategy.
First, some portion of audits of taxpayers with business income might be de­
signed to specifically look for these assets; the same strategy might be used
with respect to the National Research Program audits. Depending on the results
of this first step, a pilot program might "data mine" records of asset purchases
and check those purchases against reported income of the purchasing taxpayers.
Expensive purchases by taxpayers with low reported income might be added as
a factor in determining audit.
5. Self-financing
Self-financing is the final piece of the cash economy. Income that is not re­
ported on a cash business owner's tax return generally cannot support bank
loans, whether for business use or for home purchase or other personal use.
Bankers we spoke to explained that they relied on tax returns to support loan
applications because tax returns provide verifiable information. Accordingly, a
small business owner who fails to fully report income for tax purposes sacrific­
es the capacity of the unreported income to support bank financing and must
make do with savings or other self-financing strategies.
We heard some stories of loan applicants submitting fictional tax returns to
support applications, but bankers also explained that they routinely checked tax
returns by sending adjusted gross income or taxable income figures to the
I.R.S. Under one pilot program involving California mortgage bankers and the
I.R.S., the government informed a lender by return fax within forty-eight hours
whether submitted adjusted gross income figures substantially matched gov­
ernment records. 59 Our interviewees reported that the availability of I.R.S. veri-
59. See Kenneth Harney, Don 't Lie to Bank; the I.R.S May Be on the Other Line,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at 02 (describing prototype electronic matching program).
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fication significantly reduced borrowers' use of false tax returns in loan appli­
cations.
D. Employee Controls
Employees can be limiting factors for tax evasion by cash business taxpay­
ers because of the risks of employee cheating, blackmail and whistle-blowing.
However, our cash business owner interviewees seemed more concerned with
the possibility that their employees would cheat the business out of revenue,
just as the owners cheated the government out of taxes. One tavern owner told
us this story:
An accountant and I were watching a bartender serve drinks. First drink to a
customer, the bartender collects $6 and puts $5 in the cash register. Second
drink collects $6 and puts $3 in the cash register. Third drink, the bartender
pockets the $6. At this point, I go up to the bartender and ask him, what's the
matter, aren't we partners any more?
Many cash business owners limit underreporting to cash receipts received
by the business owner and perhaps by family members or certain trusted em­
ployees. "Never let employees in on it," one owner of a service business stated.
"If we see an employee gets cash, we make sure to march him right over to the 
bookkeeper; we make a big deal out of it. Only the cash my partner and I re­
ceive comes home." Another interviewee told us about a retail food market that
"found their margins were lower than the historic norm. They checked for 
skimming, food theft etc. to no avail. Finally, they counted the number of regis­
ters and found that there was an extra register." An employee had bought his
own register and was pocketing the revenues from the sales rung up on that reg­
ister.
Some interviewees also reported that their accounting systems deterred
employee cheating. The storekeeper quoted above believed that his convoluted
system was not susceptible to employee cheating: "[Employees] don't [cheat] if
I'm not there. I want to be able to come back and balance the books, and when 
you take cash out of my system, it's so cockamamie, that you never can figure 
out anything." In other cases, business owners reported that the automatic and 
somewhat mysterious workings of computerized bookkeeping deterred em­
ployee cheating-and sometimes owner cheating. One professional commented
that bookkeeping software made it harder to hide cash, saying that "if I could
subvert the computer software, so could my help.,,6o 
The I.R.S. still stands willing to confinn the accuracy of tax returns on short notice, general­
ly within ten days, if the loan applicant agrees to the disclosure ofthe infonnation. See I .R.S. 
Fonn 4506T. But lenders may have underutilized this program, at least in connection with
home mortgage loans. See Gretchen Morgenson, A RoadNot Taken By Lenders, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2008, at I.
60. This data point leaves open the question ofwhether technology has caused cheat-
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56 STANFORD LA W & POLICYREVIEW [Vol. 20:1  
The role of employees as a limiting factor for cash business tax evasion
might generate ideas of interest to policymakers. For example, the task of polic­
ing employees to ensure that they don't cheat the business is easier to carry out
if the owner is frequently on site. This may mean that owners of chain stores
are less likely to evade taxes, because they would be less able to stop em­
ployees from following their cheating example.
A common pattern for an expanding small business is to leave the owners
managing the "original" store, with trusted employees and family members
managing the next store or two, and at some point to rely on "outsiders" to 
manage succeeding stores. If in fact owners evade and managers do not, there
might be large discrepancies between reported profits of the original store and
the last-added store. The presence of these discrepancies might be a factor to­
ward audit; or, once a chain has been audited, a factor in the decision to devote
greater resources toward that audit.
The uneasy relationship between owners and employees might also support
expansion of the federal whistleblower program and adoption of similar pro­
grams at the state level. The federal whistleblower program, although under­
publicized, is considered a moderate success.6 1 As is often the case with tax
compliance enforcement, success has been measured by the amount of new
taxes brought in. But our study suggests that the prospect of an employee blow­
ing the whistle may deter evasion in the first instance. An expanded and effec­
tively publicized whistleblowing program that encouraged employees to inquire
about how sales are recorded for tax and other purposes might present a
double-threat to cash businesses that evade tax through off-the-books purchases
and sales. Employers would worry that employees would profit from their
knowledge by whistleblowing, or by theft.
E. Tax Preparersfor Cash Businesses
1. Overview
Available tax preparation and accountancy services vary in sophistication
ing to decrease over time. We also collected information suggesting that computer software
helped taxpayers or tax preparers back into false tax return entries. See infra Part I1I.E.3 (de­
scribing tax preparer report of taxpayer use of Turbotax); Part IILE.4 (describing involved
preparer who modified client's tax return so that she "[didn't] owe anything."). In addition,
software can assist tax cheating at the point of sale through programs that deliberately elimi­
nate certain cash sales from electronic records. See Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Zappers
and Phantomware: Are State Tax Administrators Listening Now? 49 STATE TAX NOTES 103,
105-07 (2008) (describing "phantomware" that permits retailers to manually reprogram
point-of-sale systems to eliminate certain transactions and add-on "zapper" programs stored
on memory devices that can perform the same function). 
6 1. See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tamfor Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 
357, 361 -62 (2008) (reporting on success of2006 whistleblower amendments).
  
  
       
   
   
  
          
   
 
          
         
   
           
        
          
 
 
    
    
    
        
  
 
      
   
      
  
       
  
  
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
     
  
 
   
      
  
   
    
 
 
  
    
    
    
        
       
    
    
   
   
        
 
     
     
     
  
           
   
   
   
    
       
 
    
   
  
  
       
      
    
     
     
      
  
  
      
    
  
 
   
      
  
  
     
  
    
     
 
  
    
      
   
 
         
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 57 2009
    
     
  
        
       
   
      
         
    
          
           
     
       
    
           
            
          
       
    
            
            
                
  
                 
              
          
    
         
         
      
           
      
   
  
    
    
           
  
   
          
2009] CASHBUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION 57 
and cost. CPAs at the largest accounting firms-Oeloitte, Ernst & Young,
KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers-occupy the high-sophistication, high­
cost end of the spectrum. CPAs at national firms such as BOO Seidman, Grant
Thornton, Moss Adams and RSM McGladrey follow, and then CPAs at mid­
sized regional, local, and small CPA firms. Enrolled agents are not CPAs, but
they also prepare tax returns and may represent taxpayers before the I.R.S.
They must meet certain requirements, including either satisfactory performance
on an I.R.S. exam or past technical experience with the I.R.S.62 Bookkeepers
may also prepare tax returns, but are not eligible to appear before the I.R.S.;
they self-identify and do not face licensing requirements. Mass preparers H&R
Block and Jackson Hewitt offer barebones, discount service to taxpayers with
simple returns and low or moderate income.
Business owners we interviewed described their ideal preparer as someone
who "understands cash businesses" and "will be comfortable with me" and
"creative." Most of them found their preparer through a referral from a friend, 
family member or colleague. In some cases, business owners described their
preparers as belonging to their social network. The storekeeper, for example,
said of his accountant, "He's cool; he's a buddy of mine."
Even business owners without a good lead from a trusted source reported
no trouble finding the right kind of preparer. One business owner who once
asked an accountant to sign a false tax return to present to a lender stated that
she had gone through four or five accountants in the past few decades. "My ap­
proach is that I tell them what I need and say that if they are not comfortable
with me or with being creative, we won't work out," she says, explaining that
most accountants she encountered did not refuse or express discomfort.
Our field study collected data about the tax preparers who most often serve
cash businesses-CPAs at national, mid-sized and small firms; enrolled agents;
and bookkeepers. In our interviews, we investigated whether tax preparers
know about their clients' tax evasion behavior and whether they recommend
tax evasion strategies. The interviews we conducted in Centerville provide a
good example of a segmented tax preparer market including preparers willing
to ignore their clients' evasion and preparers willing to assist it.
2. Centerville preparers
Centerville is a medium-sized city with a mixed economy of agriculture
and tourism. Its preparer market, like most preparer markets, consists of the
mix of CPAs, accountants and bookkeepers, enrolled agents, and mass prepar­
ers described above.
A is a CPA whose firm counts among its clients many of the largest busi-
62. See 10 C.F.R. § lOA (describing enrolled agent requirements).
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58 STANFORD LA W & POLICYREVIEW [Vol. 20: 1  
nesses and wealthiest families in town, including one or two publicly traded
corporations and their founding families. According to A, his clients do not
cheat on their taxes:
Interviewer Studies have shown that cash business owners
significantly underreport income. What do you
do when you have a client that fits that profile?
A I get rid of them. Maybe warn them once.
Interviewer Does that happen often?
A Maybe twice in ten years.
Interviewer That's all? Can they be underreporting income
without you knowing about it?
A Not really. You can just look at their books and
see that things don't add up.
A believes that other Centerville tax preparers share his aversion to tax 
evasion. But the other preparers tell a different story. B is a CPA in a smaller
firm with many small business clients. B guffaws when he hears A's perspec­
tive on evasion. "He thinks everyone is paying their taxes?" asks B incredu­
lously, "I know clients of A's that cheat." B also states that he knows clients
that have dropped A as an accountant because A is hard to work with. A con­
tinues to succeed, B explains, because his clients mostly consist of taxpayers
who do not receive cash, or who are comfortable hiding income from their ac­
countant as well as from the I.R.S.
B speaks knowingly about the ways business owners misreport and the
segments of the local community where misreporting is most common. He ac­
knowledges that many of his clients probably follow these practices. B is not
interested in ferreting out these clients, but says he will not actively help a
client create false books. "If a client is that clueless and wants that kind of thing
done," says B, they have to go elsewhere. B also says that he refused to prepare
taxes for two drug dealers who wanted to launder their illegal profits through a
local business.
According to B, C, an enrolled agent with a shady reputation, picked up the
drug dealers as clients. B also explains that C prepares taxes for the town boo­
kies. Separately, A mentions C as a tax preparer whose clients underreport. A
calls C a "nightmare" for clients, explaining that C has 120 audits a year com­
pared to A's rate of an audit every two years or so.
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The Centerville results are consistent with the other data from our study.
Licensed CPA preparers who did not specialize in cash businesses were most
likely to make it clear to clients that they would not tolerate unreported income.
For example, one CPA told us she asked prospective clients detailed questions
about cash flows, lifestyle and funding of activities. Frequently, the prospective
client would not come back. The CPA reported that she accepts only ten new
clients a year and has not seen her ethical standards hurt her practice, although
not many of her clients were cash businesses. She said that "her license is too
important to risk for a few extra bucks." The majority of cash business prepar­
ers were people like B, who suspected his clients of tax evasion and refused to 
help his clients cheat, but did not investigate further or make serious attempt to 
limit the cheating. A much smaller set of preparers seemed to go much farther
and actively assist tax evasion.
3. "Don't ask, don't tell" preparers
In both our Centerville interviews and our other interviews, we consistently
encountered preparers like B who maintained a distance from the details of 
their clients' recordkeeping, maintaining attitudes of "I didn't hear that" or
"You didn't tell me that" while describing their clients as "sharp" or "street
smart. " One sole proprietor CPA told us that he has three clients in the restau­
rant industry and that he practices a "don't ask, don't tell" philosophy. He looks
at checking account deposit slips, charge card income, and cash disbursements
as well as payroll and other expenses and prepares the returns accordingly. He
never advises about any cash business activity.
Similarly, another CPA called it "human nature" to cheat and said that his
clients "hide whatever they can." He said that he doesn't ask questions unless
he sees funds going through a client's checking account. If he does see such
funds, he encourages clients to report that revenue since the I.R.S. might dis­
cover it. He also explains to his clients that they need to show enough income
to cover their cost of living.
Our interviewees reported that many taxpayers gathered information about
tax evasion tactics from colleagues, friends and family. "These guys don't need
a crooked accountant" said one tax preparer. "They talk to each other all day
and learn more than they would ever get from a few hours with an accountant. "
Some preparers reported that taxpayers calculated an appropriate net income
number given fixed data points such as business rent or mortgage costs and
personal living expenses. Other tax preparers cited tax preparation software
such as TurboTax as a source of information for taxpayers. They stated that
they believed clients were running simulations with such programs in an effort
to back into a target tax amount. Many tax preparers told us that they main-
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tained files that attempted to shield them from liability by noting that informa­
tion had been provided by their clients. 63 
From a distance, it is easy to criticize the behavior of "don't ask, don't tell"
preparers. There is some research, noted earlier in this Article, that suggests
that clients tend to passively follow the advice of preparers. 64 Accordingly, ac­
tive attempts on the part of preparers to ferret out and limit tax cheating might
reduce evasion of many clients. On the other hand, the market for preparers in
this sector is highly competitive, and there is no evidence that "don't ask, don't
tell" preparers receive any form of super-normal return for their efforts. A pre­
parer who made it clear to her clients that she would not tolerate evasion, and
took active steps (for which she could not charge) to ferret out evasion, would
undoubtedly lose clients to other preparers, or to electronic software. Given the 
competitive equilibrium, it is even possible that the optimal behavior for the 
individual preparer from the perspective of the society as a whole is to maintain
a light touch, to nudge clients toward compliance without losing them to the 
involved preparers described below.
4. Involved preparers
Other preparers were more involved in their clients' tax evasion. The
storekeeper quoted above is one taxpayer whose accountant helped him main­
tain a false set of books that will pass muster on audit:
Interviewer Worry about getting caught?
Storekeeper I do, that's why, the first ten years I was totally
cheating. Honest, at that time everything was
just pulled out of thin air, kind of just looked at
what I wanted to pay, just made up figures . . . .  
Now I really got it under control, can back it up.
Interviewer Suppose you're audited.
Storekeeper I did get audited actually, but it was only over a
couple of items. Bottom line is my accountant
makes up all this backup information. So when
63. I.R.S. guidance indicates that preparers are not responsible for information not
revealed to them by taxpayers. See, e.g. , Notice 2008- 13 ,  2008-3 I.R.B. I, part III.H, Ex. 9
(giving a no-penalty fact pattern under I.R.C. Section 6694 where taxpayer failed to reveal a
bank account to the preparer).
64. See Tan, supra note 30, at 445 (reporting conclusion).
     
         
      
  
     
 
    
 
  
  
        
  
    
   
      
     
 
      
   
  
    
      
    
   
           
     
 
      
     
   
         
      
 
   
    
        
     
  
      
      
  
    
      
     
 
       
      
 
      
        
  
       
      
 
     
      
  
   
       
  
       
 
  
      
        
   
           
  
       
    
     
     
   
   
     
   
      
      
 
    
      
   
     
      
  
  
    
    
      
    
  
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 61 2009
     
   
  
 
  
  
  
     
    
  
      
  
 
   
    
     
               
                
    
    
       
         
    
     
          
         
 
    
     
    
            
              
     
             
    
   
    
              
   
             
2009] CASHBUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION 
they ask him a question, bang it's there. He goes
over all the deposits, makes them reconciled
with the sales.
Interviewer What do you tell your accountant?
Storekeeper I tell him everything.
Interviewer Think that's  typical?
Storekeeper No, 70%, 80% don't, they just do scams on their
own. That's bad news. [My accountant] tells
stories, all of a sudden he finds out his client
who reported l OOK really grossed SOOK. Noth­
ing he can do to come up with backup now.
6 1  
Another business owner described her visit to a new tax preparer and his
tactic of backing into the tax payment amount:
I visited this guy in a random office on the advice of a friend. I didn't know
how good he'd be. So we are talking and he seems sort of personable and I 
kind of flirt and say "Look, I don't  want to end up owing any money," and he
says, "Don't worry, you'll never owe any money."
So I go see him and he types everything into the computer and it's like click
click click and that's the exciting part, it's like waiting for the envelope to be
opening, to see how much l owe. And he screws up his eyebrows and says "I
think you're going to have to pay some money to the state this year," and I 
scream out "I can't, if I have to pay them I can't pay you," obviously not very
serious about not paying him but serious about not paying the state, and he 
immediately starts click click clicking and a minute later he says, "Okay, you
don't owe anything."
We heard stories about preparers who advised clients about industry aver­
ages, profit margins, and other typical practices. One common tip business
owners reported receiving from preparers, also confirmed by conversations
with preparers, was to report low values for end-of-year inventory using the
lower of cost or market (LeM) method. This increases the cost of goods sold
and lowers gross profit and taxable income, although it presents the disadvan­
tage of starting the next year with a low inventory value. One accountant, de­
scribing other preparers, stated that this kind of creative information might only
be shared for a higher fee, such as $2,000 per return rather than $200.
One tax preparer offered an economic theory of at least some of these in­
volved preparers. He stated that he saw tax preparers with less than ten years'
experience, including ex-I.R.S. agents and tax managers of national and Big
Four firms who leave to start their own practices, facilitating tax cheating by
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62 STANFORD LA W & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 20: 1
small cash businesses. "These individuals have a large nut-$300,OOO home,
wife and kids, BMW, country club dues, etcetera," he said "and since they are
not established, they are willing to be more 'flexible' with their clients' report­
ing positions."
Some interviewees, including both CPAs and business owners, reported
that non-CPAs were more willing to actively assist their misreporting, but this
observation was not uniform. (Our interviewee base did not include non-CPA
preparers.). But other business owners we interviewed used CPAs who became
involved in the details of failing to fully report cash business clients' taxable
income. CPAs may have less of a tendency to actively assist a tax evasion
strategy,65 but we found that some belong in the involved preparer category.
With only a few exceptions, preparers did not describe themselves as doing
anything to knowingly aid evasion. Our stories of involved preparers came
from clients or other preparers. Presumably, clients feel they benefit from the
help these preparers provide. Non-involved preparers feel otherwise. They view
the aid these preparers give to clients who evade taxes as morally reprehensible
and feel these preparers tarnish the reputation of others in the profession. Many
believe the involved preparer segment of the profession tends to reduce the wil­
lingness and ability of other preparers to ferret out (or at least not actively aid)
tax evasion.
Our study suggests that enforcement might be usefully directed at the in­
volved preparer segment of the cash business market. We found that while
most cash business owners could evade without preparer help, some, like the
Storekeeper described above, could not. This finding is consistent with evi­
dence outside the non-cash business sector that a small number of dishonest
preparers are associated with a disproportionate amount of tax fraud.
There is no ambiguity as to the social utility, morality or legality of the ac­
tions of these preparers.66 This differentiates the involved preparers from the
"don't ask, don't tell" preparers described above. Enforcement actions against
involved preparers would not require new law or any new interpretations of 
professional norms, and would be supported by the great majority of preparers.
An interesting social experiment would be to mount a sting operation among
65. Cj supra notes 32-34 (citing studies indicating that CPAs give less aggressive
advice in clear-cut situations and more aggressive advice in gray areas).
66. In contrast to don't ask, don't tell preparers, whose actions arguably do not give
rise to preparer penalties assuming that they rely on client-provided information, see supra
note 63, involved preparers are clearly subject to civil and criminal penalties. Criminal pe­
nalties include monetary fines up to $ 1 00,000 and up to three years' imprisonment for the
felony of "willfully aid[ing] or assist[ing]" in the preparation of a false or fraudulent return.
See I.R.C. § 7206. Civil penalties include "the greater of $ 1 000 or 50 percent of the income
derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer" for an unreasonable position, see I.R.C. 
§ 6694(a), and "the greater of $5000 or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived)
by the tax return preparer" for willful or reckless conduct. See I .R.C. § 6694(b).
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2009] CASHBUSINESSES AND TAX E VASION 63
involved cash business preparers, effectively publicize the consequences of the
operation (civil or criminal penalties for the affected preparers), and look at the
effect of that operation on taxes paid by other members of the cash business
community targeted by publicity.
F. The Risk of Getting Caught
As noted above, the standard economic model treats compliance as a sim­
ple cost-benefit decision in which taxpayers weigh the gains from evasion
against the likelihood of detection and the penalties that accompany detec­
tion.67 The perceived likelihood of getting caught is, unsurprisingly, a key de­
terminate of evasion. The likelihood of getting caught is, in tum, a function of 
the odds of getting audited, and the chance that unreported income will be un­
covered on that audit.
The overall federal audit rate on individual returns dropped to a little over
one-half of one percent in 2001 and 2002 but has risen since then.68 That over­
all figure is misleading, however. It includes as audits notices sent to taxpayers
who have omitted interest or other income.69 Since interest income, for exam­
ple, is automatically reported to the government, the omission of such income
is generally inadvertent and the amounts omitted are generally small. On the
other hand, the odds of audit are determined by a (secret) government regres­
sion, the so-called DIF, which is designed to maximize audit revenue. 70 As 
noted earlier, the rate of underreporting in the cash business sector is absolutely
high and high relative to virtually any other sector of the economy. Due to the 
lack of paper records and other factors, the cash business sector is difficult to 
audit. Still, given the absolute and relative levels of evasion in this sector one
might imagine that the audit rate would be relatively high for cash business
taxpayers and that taxpayers in this sector would perceive the risk of detection
and penalty as relatively high.
In fact, cash business owners seemed surprisingly unconcerned about audit
risk and penalties. The storekeeper's statement quoted above, provides one ex-
67. See supra text accompanying note 9 (describing classic economic model).
68. In 2007, the overall rate was 1.03%. See generally I.R.S. Doc. 2008-1 7 ,  released
January 17, 2008, available at http://ww.irs.gov/pub/irs-
newslirs_enforcemenCand_service_tables_fy_2007.pdf.
69. In 2007, for example, the vast majority of audits were "correspondence" audits, a
category that includes simple notification of error. See id. 
70. The I.R.S. explains that computer scoring rates returns based on the chance that an
audit will result in a change in the amount of tax due (the Discriminant Function System, or
"DIF" score) and the likelihood of unreported income (the "UIDIF" score). See I .R.S. FACT
SHEET 2006-10 (2006) (describing audit selection methods).
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64 STANFORD LA W & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 20:1 
ample; 7 1 the fact that cash business owners were willing to speak so candidly to
us is another. Our results suggest that one reason for this attitude is that audits
and audit-related penalties were surprisingly uncommon among our subjects.
The experience of one preparer in our sample is illustrative. He guessed that his
clients were typical of cash business owners and hid a substantial portion of 
their income. Yet in a typical year only a handful of his 300 or so clients were
audited and while audits produced additional payments they did not lead to civ­
il penalties. He had never had a client threatened with criminal penalties.
The government typically realizes at least four or five times the cost of the 
audit from back taxes, interest and penalties levied against taxpayers. 72 In addi­
tion, audits deter evasion. Most studies show that the latter, general deterrence,
effect of audits overwhelms the direct revenue effect. 73 One recent study esti­
mates the general deterrence effect is over ten times the direct revenue effect,
and that a doubling of audit funding at the federal level would increase taxes by
as much as 60 times the cost of the additional audits. 74 This ratio overestimates
the true benefits of audits, in part by omitting the costs of time and professional
fees borne by those audited.
Future studies might test our finding that cash business owners do not
perceive a significant risk of audit, detection and the application of significant
penalties. For example, one might survey random samples of cash business
owners and employees. Cash business owners are known to systematically
evade taxes while employees are known to pay virtually all taxes due on wage
income, so the audit risk is certainly higher for cash business owners than for
employees. A finding, consistent with our study, that the cash business group
does not perceive a much greater risk than the employee group, suggests that
we should try to increase the perception of cash business audit risk. For exam­
ple, we might profitably put more resources into cash business audits, or at
least take steps (consistent with individual taxpayer privacy) to better publicize
current audits in the area. 75 
7 1 .  See supra Part III.EA (describing fake books intended to provide an airtight audit
defense).
72. See Cash Economy, supra note 2, at 5 1 4  (explaining that audits raise far more tax
than they cost); David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Enlists Outside Help in Collecting Delinquent
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES , Aug. 20, 2006, § I ,  at 1 2  (citing I.R.S. figure stating that $9 billion could
be collected at a cost ofthree cents on the dollar).
73. See Cash Economy, supra note 2, at 5 1 4  & n.6 (describing the deterrence effects
of audits).
74. See Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer
Noncompliance, 35 PUB. FIN. REv. 500, 523 (2007) (estimating that "an additional dollar al­
located to audit would return $63 in general deterrence.").
75. See Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. Part III.B (forthcoming 2009) (discussing audit publicity strategies).
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2009] CASH BUSINESSES AND TAX EVASION 65
G. Why Do Small Cash Businesses Evade Taxes?
Our interview results suggest that the reasons for cash business tax evasion
are predominantly norms and opportunity-not complexity or morality or op­
position to government policy. In general, the business owners and preparers
that we interviewed reported that they cheated on their taxes because ( 1) people
they know and trust who are in the same position cheat on their taxes and (2)
there is a very low likelihood that they will get caught. However, a few inter­
viewees said they believed that cash business tax evasion was roughly equiva­
lent to a sensible government subsidy for small businesses.
1. Family and friends 
Misreporting of income is such a common practice among our interviewees
and their business circle that most of them found themselves at a loss at first
when asked when and why they decided to underreport. "Honestly, when I saw
how much tax [the I.R.S.] would take from me, I never even thought of paying
it," stated one business owner. Tax preparers similarly considered failure to re­
port cash income as an inevitable response to self-interest and opportunity.
Further questioning, however, often revealed that taxpayers learned eva­
sion behavior from family and friends. The storekeeper quoted above, for ex­
ample, had this exchange with the interviewer:
Interviewer How did you first decide to non-report?
Storekeeper I grew up knowing that; learned it from the
swap meet where I used to sell stuff. They gave
you an envelope to list sales and put in sales
tax-nobody put in anything. If you did, the guy
who ran it would just take it. My dad did it [i.e., 
non-reported] big time but always told me, "Pay
the f� taxes, there's plenty there for every­
one." He was smoking but telling me not to 
smoke.
The same storekeeper explained that he has advised friends and associates
about how to evade taxes safely. "I tell people everything," he told us, "Like
never, ever deposit the cash." Other business owners we interviewed showed a
similar readiness to advise others. One related, "When I saw how stupidly [my
cousin] was taking the cash, in front of employees, I almost died. Lucky I got to 
him in time." And tax preparers confirmed that tax evasion tactics are shared
wisdom among cash business owners.
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66 STANFORD LA W & POLICY REVIEW [Vol . 20: 1
The possibility of noon absorption from family and friends is highlighted
by the story of two cash business owners (whom we call the Vs) who had left
their longtime jobs with large employers to start their own business. They did
not misreport income, but they knew that fellow small business owners in their
town evaded taxes and seemed embarrassed to admit compliance. They de­
scribed their preparer as follows:
Ms. V 
Mr. V
Ms. V
He's a very straight, Republican kind of guy.
Good, but not the kind of guy you'd hire to do 
things for you.
We could probably do better.
But you know that's okay, the I.R.S. is not any­
one I would want to be in trouble with. He's
competent; I think he's doing a good job.
Perhaps the Vs comply because they do not come from a circle of friends 
and family who practice tax noncompliance, but rather from a background as 
employees of large employers who presumably practiced tax compliance. If so,
it is possible that the Vs will in time adopt the noons of their new sector. 76
The Vs' story suggests that new entrants into the cash sector may exhibit
different behavior than those who have spent many years in the sector, and
have thus learned how others underreport. It might be possible to test this hypo­
thesis through examination of tax filings or other longitudinal research.
2. Complexity, morality and opportunity
Neither cash business owners nor preparers cited tax rule complexity as a
contributing factor in their decision to evade. This may suggest that efforts to 
reduce the tax gap through simplification are misguided, at least for cash busi­
ness owners.
In addition, for the most part, business owners and preparers did not claim
that their decision to evade was morally sound. Most business owners or tax
preparers we interviewed did not defend evasion on grounds of resentment or
anger at the government in general or the tax system in particular. "Why do 
people cheat?" asked one preparer rhetorically, "I'll tell you why. You'd rather
have $10 than $5. What you think of the tax isn't relevant."
76. Cf Wenzel, supra note 20, at 504-05 (reporting study results showing that the
compliance norms ofa taxpayer's peers could affect the taxpayer's compliance behavior).
  
  
    
     
     
      
       
    
    
   
   
     
       
 
           
 
  
  
    
      
   
 
   
 
      
   
 
 
    
 
  
  
    
 
   
  
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
  
  
  
    
    
 
     
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
   
  
  
   
   
 
     
  
  
   
 
  
   
    
   
  
  
  
     
  
   
  
  
 
   
     
  
  
   
    
   
  
      
    
     
  
   
  
   
     
  
  
 
     
   
 
 
    
 
  
   
 
   
  
 
 
  
    
  
  
HeinOnline -- 20 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 67 2009
    
 
       
       
   
        
        
           
    
     
           
     
    
  
      
       
             
       
          
           
              
       
         
          
        
         
            
            
        
       
      
         
            
2009] CASH BUSINESSES AND TAXEVASION 67
Nevertheless, some interviewees described their tax evasion as sound gov­
ernment policy. One considered tax evasion by cash businesses a subsidy "that
equates to direct subsidies to farmers or bail-outs to various international busi­
nesses." He believed small businesses deserved such a subsidy and explained
that "a small business person is key to a healthy economy." Several other inter­
viewees shared this view. Some also cited revenue pressures, arguing that full 
payment of taxes would wipe out many small businesses' profits.
Our interview results here generally agree with other research cited above:
Tax cheating follows opportunity, not complexity or immorality, and it is
shaped by peer influence. 77 Perceptions of tax system equities are sometimes
salient, but are generally less important to compliance decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cash business owners rely on parallel cash economies to underreport re­
ceipts and thereby evade income, employment and sales taxes. Many preparers
in this sector adopt a "don't ask, don't tell" attitude toward their clients re­
ported receipts. A small minority of preparers, however, actively aid in their
clients' evasion. Evasion seems best explained by opportunity, including the
low-perceived likelihood of detection and penalty, and by peer norms. The per­
ceived equity of the tax system has less importance, and the complexity of the
tax law does not appear to play a significant role.
Our study generates a number of testable hypotheses, including hypotheses
as to factors that might trigger productive audits and factors that might increase
the revenue from audits. We also generate a number of policy ideas. These in­
clude prescriptions relating to the frequency of, and publicity accompanying,
audits in this area, and to the policing of the small segment of the involved pre­
parers in this area. Perhaps the greatest contribution of this study, however, is
the qualitative picture it provides of taxpayer and preparer behavior in the cash
business sector, which can aid the development of additional tax compliance
hypotheses, communication strategies, and policy prescriptions.
77. See supra Part II .B (describing income source as the most important tax evasion
factor); Part II.C (discussing previous work on peer influence and social norms).
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